Fenomenology of consciousness
The phenomenology of the spirit
INTRODUCTION
I - Sensitive certainty or: the This or the aiming
II - Perception or: the thing and the illusion
III - Force and Understanding; Phenomenon and supersensible world
IV - The truth of self-certainty
A - INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: DOMINATION AND SLAVERY
B - FREEDOM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: STOICISM, SKEPTICISM AND UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS
V - Certainty and truth of reason
A - OBSERVING REASON
a - OBSERVATION OF NATURE
b. OBSERVATION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN ITS PURITY AND IN ITS REFERENCE TO EXTERNAL EFFECTIVITY: LOGICAL LAWS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS
c. OBSERVATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS WITH ITS IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVITY: PHYSIOGNOMY AND PHRENOLOGY
B - EFFECTIVENESS OF RATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH ITSELF
a. PLEASURE AND NECESSITY
b. THE LAW OF THE HEART AND THE DELIRIUM OF PRESUMPTION
c. VIRTUE AND THE COURSE OF THE WORLD
C - THE INDIVIDUALITY THAT IS REAL IN AND FOR ITSELF
a - THE ANIMAL KINGDOM OF THE SPIRIT AND IMPOSTURE - OR THE THING ITSELF
b - LEGISLATIVE REASON
c - REASON EXAMINING THE LAWS
VI - The Spirit
A - THE TRUE SPIRIT. ETHICS
a - THE ETHICAL WORLD. HUMAN LAW AND DIVINE LAW, MAN AND WOMAN
b - ETHICAL ACTION. HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, GUILT AND DESTINY
c - THE RULE OF LAW
B - THE SPIRIT ALIENATED FROM ITSELF.
1 - THE WORLD OF THE SPIRIT ALIENATED FROM ITSELF
a. CULTURE AND ITS KINGDOM OF EFFECTIVENESS
b. FAITH AND PURE INTELLIGENCE
2 - ENLIGHTENMENT
a. THE FIGHT OF ENLIGHTENMENT AGAINST SUPERSTITION
b. THE TRUTH OF ENLIGHTENMENT
3 - ABSOLUTE FREEDOM AND TERROR
C - THE SPIRIT CERTAIN OF ITSELF. MORALITY
a - THE MORAL VIEW OF THE WORLD
b - DISSIMULATION
c - GOOD CONSCIENCE - THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL, EVIL AND ITS FORGIVENESS
VII - Religion
A - NATURAL RELIGION
a - LUMINOSITY
b - THE PLANT AND THE ANIMAL
c- THE ARTISAN
B - THE RELIGION OF ART
a - THE ABSTRACT WORK OF ART
b - THE LIVING WORK OF ART
c - THE SPIRITUAL WORK OF ART
C - MANIFEST RELIGION
VIII - Absolute Knowledge
Immobile indifference, being-there, representation, spirit, activity, movement, one does not conceiv…
Immobile indifference, being-there, representation, spirit, activity, movement, one does not conceive of oneself, knowing, being-well, knowledge is the action of the universal Self
Interest in thinking, It is the most common way of deceiving oneself and deceiving others: to presup…
Interest in thinking, It is the most common way of deceiving oneself and deceiving others: to presuppose in knowledge something as already known and leave it as it is, an immediate property of the Self, a becoming
Why?
The spirit now demands from philosophy not so much the knowledge of what it is, but to rescue, throu…
The spirit now demands from philosophy not so much the knowledge of what it is, but to rescue, through it, that substantiality and density of being that it had lost. - The beautiful, the sacred, religion, love are the bait required to awaken the pleasure of nibbling. It is not the concept, but the ecstasy, it is not the cold and methodical necessity of the Thing that must constitute the force that sustains andIt transmits the richness of the substance, but rather the burning enthusiasm.
Impatience demands the impossible, that is, the attainment of the end without the means. On the one …
Impatience demands the impossible, that is, the attainment of the end without the means. On the one hand, one must endure the long distances of this path, because each moment is necessary. On the other hand, one must linger over each moment, because each of them is a complete individual figure, and thus each moment is only considered absolutely as long as its determinateness isseen as whole or concrete, or the whole is seen in the peculiarity of this determination.
The immediate being-there of the spirit - consciousness - has two moments: that of knowledge and tha…
The immediate being-there of the spirit - consciousness - has two moments: that of knowledge and that of objectivity, negative in relation to knowledge. When in this element the spirit develops and exposes its moments, this opposition falls back on them, and then they all emerge as figures of consciousness. The science of this itinerary is the science of the experience that makes consciousness; the substance is treated as it and its movement are objects of consciousness. Consciousness knows nothing, conceives nothing, that is not in its experience, for what is in experience is only the spiritual substance, and in truth, as the object of its own Self. The spirit, however, becomes an object, for it is this movement of becoming other - that is, the object of its Self - and of subsuming this Other being. Experience is precisely the name of this movement in which the immediate, the unexperienced, that is, the abstract - whether of the sensible being or of the Simple merely thought - is alienated and then regains itself from this alienation; and for this reason - as it is also a property of consciousness - only then is it exposed in its effectiveness and truth.
One could wish to be freed from the negative as false and led without delay to the truth; why get en…
One could wish to be freed from the negative as false and led without delay to the truth; why get entangled with the false?
The false - for it is only this that is the subject here - would be the Other, the negative of the substance, which is the true, as the content of knowledge. But the substance itself is essentially the negative; partly as differentiation and determination of content, partly as a simple differentiation, that is, as Self and knowledge in general. Apparition is the arising and passing that neither arises nor passes, but which in itself constitutes the effectiveness and movement of the life of truth. The true is thus the Bacchic delirium, in which there is no member that is not drunk; and because each member, when separated, also immediately dissolves, this delirium is at the same time a translucent and simple repose. Before the tribunal of this movement neither the singular figures of the spirit nor the determined thoughts can stand; for there they are as much necessary positive moments as they are negative and evanescent.
Complaints about the incomprehensibility of philosophical works are due above all to this unusual re…
Complaints about the incomprehensibility of philosophical works are due above all to this unusual restraint, when they come from people who otherwise have a level of education adequate to understand them. We see, in what has been said, the reason for a very specific and frequent reproach, that for the most part philosophical writings must be read more than once before they are understood - a reproach that there must be something ofirrefutable and definitive to the point that, if it were proven, it would not admit of any reply. But, from what has been said above, this question is clearly stated. The philosophical proposition, because it is a proposition, evokes the idea of the customary relationship between subject and predicate, and of the customary procedure of knowledge. This procedure and the idea about it are destroyed by the philosophical content; the current opinion experiences that something other than what it supposed was understood; and this correction, of what it opined, forces knowledge to return to the proposition and to understand it now differently.
The subject is true: and as such it is only the dialectical movement, this walking that produces its…
The subject is true: and as such it is only the dialectical movement, this walking that produces itself, that advances and that returns to itself
Essence, science, idealism, certainty of oneself, interiority, Self immanent to the content, being O…
Essence, science, idealism, certainty of oneself, interiority, Self immanent to the content, being Other
The master and the slave
I reread it completely in the revised edition, and, on the second reading, I disliked it less than I…
I reread it completely in the revised edition, and, on the second reading, I disliked it less than I expected and even ended up liking it.
They must wage this struggle because they must raise to the truth, in the Other and in themselves, t…
They must wage this struggle because they must raise to the truth, in the Other and in themselves, their certainty of being for themselves. Only by putting their lives at risk can freedom be proven; and it is proven that the essence of self-consciousness is not being, nor the immediate way in which it arises, nor its submersion in the expansion of life; but that there is nothing in self-consciousness that is not for it an evanescent moment; that it is only pure being for itself. The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person; but he has not achieved the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. Just as he risks his life, each one must also tend towards the death of the other; for for him the Other is no more valuable than himself. His essence presents itself to him as Other, it is outside of him; he must subsume his being outside of himself. The Other is an essential consciousness and in many ways entangled; self-consciousness must intuit its being Other as pure being for itself, or as absolute negation.
However, this verification by means of death suppresses precisely the truth that should result from …
However, this verification by means of death suppresses precisely the truth that should result from it, and thereby also suppresses self-certainty in general. For just as life is the natural position of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the natural negation of this same consciousness, negation without independence, which is thus deprived of the intended significance of recognition.
You are the self-essential consciousness, but you are no longer merely the concept of this conscious…
You are the self-essential consciousness, but you are no longer merely the concept of this consciousness, but a self-essential consciousness that is mediated to you by means of another consciousness, namely, by means of a consciousness whose essence belongs to being synthesized with an independent being, or with thingness in general. You are related to these two moments: to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness for which thingness is essential. Therefore, you:
a) as a concept of self-consciousness are the immediate relation of being to itself; but,
b) at the same time as mediation, or as abeing for itself that is only for itself through Another, is related.
a’) immediately with both moments; and b’) mediately, with each one through the other.
The master relates mediately to the slave through the independent being, for precisely there the sla…
The master relates mediately to the slave through the independent being, for precisely there the slave is held; this is his chain, from which he could not abstract himself in the struggle, and for this reason he showed himself to be dependent, for having his independence in thinghood. The master, however, is the power over this being, for he showed in the struggle that such being is valid for him only as a negative. The master is the power that is above this being; now, this being is the power that is above the Other; therefore, the master has this Other below him: this is the syllogism of domination.
The master also relates mediately through the slave to the thing; the slave, as self-consciousness i…
The master also relates mediately through the slave to the thing; the slave, as self-consciousness in general, alsorelates negatively to the thing, and subsumes it. But at the same time the thing is independent for him, and he cannot, therefore, by his negation, put an end to it until its annihilation; that is, the slave only works it. On the contrary, for the master, through this mediation, the immediate relationship becomes like the pure negation of the thing, or like enjoyment - which achieves for him what desire could not: to put an end to the thing, and to be still in enjoyment. Desire could not achieve this because of the independence of the thing; but the master introduced the slave between himself and the thing, and thus it is concluded only with the dependence of the thing, and he purely enjoys it; while the side of independence is left to the slave, who works it.
But for recognition proper, the moment is missing when the master operates upon the other what the o…
But for recognition proper, the moment is missing when the master operates upon the other what the other would operate upon himself; and the slave does upon himself what he would also do upon the Other. Therefore, what has been effected is a unilateral and unequal recognition.
We have only seen what slavery is in relation to domination. But the slave consciousness is consciou…
We have only seen what slavery is in relation to domination. But the slave consciousness is consciousness of itself, and it is important to consider now what it is in itself and for itself. First, for the slave consciousness, the master is the essence; therefore, the independent consciousness that is essential for itself is the truth for it; but for it the truth is not yet in it, although it does indeed have within itself this truth of pure negativity and being for itself; for it has experienced this essence within itself. This consciousness felt the anguish, not because of this or that, not because of this or that moment, but through its entire essence, for it felt the fear of death, of the absolute master. There it dissolved inwardly; it trembled in its entirety within itself; and everything that was fixed in it wavered.
The form does not become other than consciousness by the fact that it has externalized itself, for p…
The form does not become other than consciousness by the fact that it has externalized itself, for precisely this form is its pure being for itself, which in this externalization becomes truth for it. Thus, precisely in work, where it seemed to be only an alien sense, consciousness, through this rediscovery of itself by itself, becomes its own sense.
Jacques-Alain Miller - Lacan elucidated
The definition ofThe difference between master and slave is: the latter recognizes the former, who recognizes no one. Hegel concludes that the essential thing is that the slave triumphs by having recognized the other and is susceptible to being recognized symmetrically, and by dedicating himself to work he will become the key to history. The master is fixated on not recognizing the other, confronted purely and simply with his inevitable death. He stands apart from work, faced with the question of his mastery. While the slave dedicates himself to work and enjoyment, the master remains contemplating the assumption of his mastery, and, at the same time, becomes an element outside the dialectic.
This was the fiction that inspired Marx, because it contains the promise that the future belongs to the slave, the one who produces. This is a key point in Hegel.